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1 Introduction
The idea that firms should be run in the owner’s interest is usually accepted
so that in modern public corporations, where property and management are
commonly separated, a problem arises of providing managers with the right
incentives to implement the shareholders’ value. Most of the corporate gover-
nance literature addresses exactly this agency problem and describes a number
of possible solutions to it. In their comprehensive survey, Becht et al. (2002)
identify five mechanisms currently used to discipline managers: the presence
of a large shareholder, the market for corporate control (e.g. the threat of a
hostile takeover), the board of directors, executive compensation packages and,
finally, the managers’ loyalty duty coupled with an effective shareholder legal
protection1. Even if in the last twenty years a large body of both empirical and
theoretical analysis has emerged, the real functioning and effectiveness of these
governance mechanisms are not well understood yet.
At least since Smith (1776), another source of managerial discipline has been
identified with the competitiveness of the product market. The basic idea goes
as follows: in firms that operate under a strong competitive pressure, any lack of
efficiency reduces profits and seriously threat the survival possibility in the mar-
ket. Managers concerned with the very conservation of their job would then work
as hard as they can to ensure profit maximization. As intuitive as it may appear
at a first glance, a closer consideration of this idea rises at least two questions.
First, what does a "more competitive market" exactly mean? Second, through
which mechanisms the degree of product market competitiveness affects the
managerial behavior? All the models I’m aware of treating this intuitive idea,
assume that managers sign a formal contract that makes their compensation
contingent on some measure of the firm efficiency (cost reductions, accounting
profits...). In this way they are provided with incentives, indeed with the most
classical instrument analyzed in the principal agent literature. Then, since the
optimal contract offered by the firm is somehow linked with the competitive-
ness of the environment, the degree of competition indirectly affects managerial
incentives. In this framework increased competition has then been assumed
to either affect the information structure behind the contingent contract or to
simply decrease the amount of profits earned by the firms. The model by Hart
(1983) is in line with the first idea: in his paper the principal observes a cost
index which depends on both an industry wide shock and the managerial effort.
A more competitive product market then allows the principal to make better
inferences about the agent’s contribution. With a very special assumption on
the agent preferences, Hart shows that agents work harder in more competitive
markets. Scharfstein (1988 a) however shows that this conclusion is not robust
1Another very well known survey of corporate governance is by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
Here the authors suggest that the essential elements of a successful governance system are some
form of concentrated ownership and legal protection of investors. There is a number of other
general treatment of the issue. For example Tirole (2001) tries to analyze the role of the so
called stakeholder society while Zingales (1998) frames the corporate governance problem in
an incomplete contract approach.
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to alternative specifications on the managerial utility function.
The idea that more intense competition decreases profits has been analyzed
for example in the papers by Hermalin (1993) and Schmidt (1997). In both
cases smaller profits for the firm are shown to have an ambiguous effect on the
optimal contract and managerial effort. A mechanism that induce ambiguity
in both models is what Schmidt calls the value-of-a-cost-reduction effect and
Hermalin calls the change-in-the-relative-value-of-actions effect. To grasp the
general idea consider a situation in which the efficiency of a firm can be either
high or low and let πH and πL be the corresponding profits in the two cases.
Of course πH > πL. More competition decreases both πH and πL, but what is
really relevant is how competition affects the difference πH−πL, that is referred
to as the value of efficiency in this paper, and this difference can either decrease
or increase. Schmidt also identifies a bankruptcy effect that unambiguously
rises managerial effort: in a more competitive market, because of the smaller
amount of profits that can be earned, the probability of bankruptcy is higher
an managers tend to work harder to avoid it. Hermalin uses a concave utility
function in his model so that two more effects emerge: an income effect and a
risk adjustment effect, both of them of ambiguous sign. However, both effects
disappear if managers are assumed to be risk neutral (and then with a quasi-
linear utility function with respect to money).
A different approach is taken by Willig (1987). Still retaining the usual
principal-agent framework, he identifies increased competition in the product
market with a smaller and more elastic (residual) demand function. From his
analysis emerges that a smaller demand tends to reduce efficiency while the
increased elasticity raises it. Again, the overall effect is ambiguous.
A common characteristic of the literature discussed so far, is that the strate-
gic interaction among firms operating in an imperfectly competitive product
market is ignored and the market structure is then assumed to be exogenous.
An exception is Raith (2003) who analyzes explicitly a market game among firms
run by managers rewarded in accordance to the cost reduction they induce. By
doing so, Raith is able to naturally identify the market competitiveness with
some parameters of the model. In particular he shows that more substitutable
products or a larger market size induce managers to provide more effort while
a reduction in the entry cost reduces managerial effort. In any cases a positive
correlation between managerial incentives and profit volatility arises. To some
extent his results are still ambiguous: smaller entry cost or larger substitutabil-
ity could both be regarded as increased competition but have opposite effects
on the equilibrium managerial effort.
In the model developed here, I depart from the previous literature in that
incentives indirectly stem from the managerial career concerns. The advantage
of such an approach is that it doesn’t rely on the possibility for the firms to
offer contingent payments, which is not always the case, but on the fact that
managers are concerned with their future job conditions. From this point of
view the present approach seems to be more general.
The model has two periods and in each periods two firms compete in the
product market. Firms are run by managers that has to be hired at the begin-
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ning of each period with a fixed salary. The managerial ability and effort, then,
determine firm’s efficiency and profits. The managerial talent is symmetrically
unknown to everybody in period one and effort is not observable by firms. All
the managers have the same, commonly known, priors over their ability so that
they are homogeneous from the point of view of the firms. Because of this ho-
mogeneity, young managers have a very weak bargaining position in the labor
market which is here represented as a sequential game where first firms offer a
wage to each manager and then managers choose one of them (if any). Such
labor market structure allows firms to hire young managers at the reservation
wage. In period two, however, the observation of past performance allows some
inference about the managerial skill. The manager who performed the best is
now more valuable to the firms and he obtains a wage premium on the labor
market equal to the extra profits he is able to produce with respect to the other
manager who is on the contrary rehired at his reservation wage. This extra
profit is called the value of efficiency and is the analogue of the value of a cost
reduction in Schmidt (1997). A central result of the literature described above is
then confirmed: a change in the product market that rises the value of efficiency
tends to increase the managerial effort. After considering some specific example
of market game, the model is used to study the impact of the threat of a hostile
takeover in period two. Such a threat affects the firms with the worst man-
ager but, since he is already at his reservation wage, incentives are not affected.
From the other hand, a successful takeover has a negative external effect on the
good manager since it reduces his wage premium: the overall ex-ante effect on
incentives is then negative. However the model is descriptive of organizations in
which managers are not able to enjoy any rents in case of a poor performance,
so that it seems likely that other effective corporate governance mechanisms are
at work (e.g. an effective board monitoring).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section two the basic
model is introduced and the managerial equilibrium effort is characterized. It is
then argued that the main determinant of managerial career concerns is the value
of efficiency. The impact of a changes in the market environment on indirect
incentives passes, then, through their effect on the value of an efficient manager.
In section three I consider some example of explicit market games and, using
the results previously obtained, I am able to evaluate how parameter values
affect indirect incentives. In section four I then introduce the possibility of a
hostile takeover which in the present contest is shown to reduce both managerial
incentives and expected compensation. Section five contains some final remarks.
2 Career Concerns within a Duopoly
2.1 The Basic Model
The are two periods t = 1, 2 and in each period two firms compete in the
product market. Each firm is made by a principal (the owner) and an agent
(the manager) who has to be hired at the beginning of each period t with
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a constant salary wt.2 Contingent payments are not allowed and long term
binding contracts cannot be signed. There are two managers to be hired whose
innate ability, or skill, is symmetrically unknown at the beginning of period one.
To make things simpler I assume that each manager has a reservation salary w
which is independent of his age and past experience. The competitive strength
of a firm is summarized by an efficiency parameter x whose value is affected by
the managerial skill and activity. More precisely firm hiring manager i in period
t has in that period an efficiency parameter:
xi,t = ηi + ei,t + εi,t (1)
where ηi is manager i’s innate ability (or skill or talent), ei,t ∈ [0, e¯] is his effort in
period t, and εi,t is an idiosyncratic random component. The manager’s ability
and effort are then substitutes in rising such an efficiency parameter and then the
firm’s strength in the product market. Such x-value can be thought of as some
measure of what Leibenstein (1966) called X-efficiency, as opposed to allocative
efficiency. The X-efficiency of a firm is typically determined by those cost re-
ducing activities (plant restructuring, waste reductions, work methods and so
on) that are directly under the managerial control. In period one ηi ∼ N(0, σ2η)
while εi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ε) for any manager and any period. All random variables are
assumed to be independent. In the following I will use the notational convention
of identifying a generic manager with the superscript i while superscript j will
denote the other one, finally superscript n will denote a generic firm.
The timing of events in period one is as follows:
0. Managers’ ability are independently determined according to a N(0, σ2η)
distribution and are not revealed to anyone.
1. Firms bid to hire a manager.
2. Both managers decide how much effort to exert, then the efficiency pa-
rameters are determined according to 1 and publicly observed.
3. Firms compete in the product market.
In period two events from 1 to 3 take place anew. Agents are assumed to
be risk neutral and their utility is simply w1 + w2 − g(e1) − g(e2), where g(e)
is the cost of exerting effort e ∈ [0, e¯]. The function g is twice continuously
differentiable strictly increasing and strictly convex, furthermore g(0) = g0(0) =
0 and lim
e→e−
g0(e) =∞. Firms maximize total expected profits.
In order to fully describe the extensive form game to be analyzed, it is
necessary to specify how the bidding phase in point 1 is realized. I assume
that both firms simultaneously submit a wage offer to each manager. Then, in
period 1 an equal probability lottery decides which of the two managers has to
2 In the following the firm owner will be referred to as a female while the manager as a
male.
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make the choice between the offers he faces, if any, while the other manager
will not be able to accept the offer received by the firm that closed its vacancy.
In period two, if both managers worked in the first period, the manager who
previously performed the best has the advantage of being the first to make a
decision. Note that observing exactly the same managerial efficiency in the first
period is a zero probability event and will induce a subgame in which managers
are still identical, in such a case the rules of the first period are still applied. I
will also assume that if a manager is not assumed by any firm in the first period,
he will exit the industry so that he will not be on the labor market in the second
period. His lifetime utility in this case is then 2w.
I consider these particular bidding rules to capture two relevant characteris-
tics of the managerial labor market. First, in the market for young and inexpe-
rienced managers, firms have the strongest contractual position: the point here
is that young managers are very close substitute to one another, for example
because their past careers is not very informative about their talent as CEO in
that particular industry, so that they compete very closely and firms can finally
extract almost all the surplus generated by the relationship (in fact all the sur-
plus in the model). Second, a senior manager with a good past performance
is a "scarce good" in the managerial labor market and then he has a stronger
bargaining position allowing him to obtain part of the surplus. The model cap-
tures this feature with the rule that assigns to the good manager the priority in
choosing between the firm offers.
For the purposes of this paper it is better not to consider an explicit market
game. I will rather describe the firms interaction in the product market by
means of a (reduced form) profit function. In particular if xt = (x1,t, x2,t)
are the realized efficiency parameters in period t, for firm 1 and 2 respectively,
product market competition yields to the firm hiring manager i the amount of
profits:
πi,t = π(φ, xi,t, xj,t) (2)
where the function π : Φ × R2 → R is bounded both above and below, it is
increasing in xi,t and decreasing in xj,t (monotonicity properties being strict in
at least one argument) and, furthermore, it is twice continuously differentiable.
The parameter φ belongs to some open interval Φ ⊂ R, and will be used to
index the degree of competition in the product market with the interpretation
that a higher φ corresponds to a more competitive environment.
Note that with the assumptions made on the function π, a higher efficiency
parameter corresponds to higher profits for the firm who realizes it, and to
lower profits for its competitor. Then a larger efficiency parameter corresponds
to a stronger firm in the market. Note also that firms are in a substantial
symmetric position in the market: it is only the realized efficiency parameters
that determines profits and not their particular distribution among firms. This
formalization, then, is not descriptive of those circumstances in which some
firms have other sources of market power, as for example would be the case if
6
one of the firms were a Stackelberg leader, or had an information advantage over
the demand structure, etc.3 In principle a firm could be run without a manager,
that would be the case if some manager prefers the outside option, but I assume
that the profits would then be so low that any strategy involving wage offers
below the managers’ reservation value are weakly dominated and are suboptimal
whenever the probability of hiring nobody is positive. More precisely, I assume
that if a firm doesn’t hire a manager its profits are π(φ) < inf
x,y
π(φ, x, y) − w,
while a firm managed with efficiency x and facing a competitor with no manager
obtains a profit of π(φ, x) = sup
y
π(φ, x, y).
How the degree of product market competition (here indexed by the pa-
rameter φ) affects the amount of profits that can be earned is not very clear
in general terms. For example, Boone (2000, 2004) analyses several examples
of oligopoly markets where the strength of competition is naturally identified
with the value of some parameter4. He finds that as competition increases, the
amount of profits earned by the least efficient firm decreases but he also finds
that the ratio between the profits of any firm and those of a less efficient one
increases. With identical firms this result simply means that increased compe-
tition decreases the profits of every firm. However, when firms with different
efficiencies coexist in the market, the result suggests the traditional "selection
effect" of competition already described for example in Vickers (1995).5 Since
the main focus of this paper is on the relationship between the strength of career
concerns and product market competition, I’ll rather consider the following two
alternative conditions that, as it will be shown thereafter, play a crucial role for
what is at stake here.
Condition 1 (IVE) For each (x, y) the difference π2(φ, x, y) − π3(φ, y, x) is
strictly increasing in φ.
Condition 2 (DVE) For each (x, y) the difference π2(φ, x, y) − π3(φ, y, x) is
strictly decreasing in φ.
To interpret these VE (marginal Value of Efficiency) conditions consider the
difference π(φ, x, y) − π(φ, y, x). It represents the profit differential that a firm
of efficiency x can produce when it competes with a firm of efficiency y, so that
it could be thought of as the value of x versus y. Such differential has of course
the sign of x − y and depends on the product market degree of competition.
The derivative π2(φ, x, y) − π3(φ, y, x) represents then the marginal value of
3However, the formulation could easily allow for changing market conditions between period
one and two: it would be enough to have different profit functions in the two periods. To add
this possibility wouldn’t change anything in the analysis so I prefer to stay with the notation
introduced in the text.
4He considers three different sources of increased competition: a larger number of firms,
more aggressive market interactions and more efficient competitors.
5Boone also finds that some quantities commonly used to empirically asses the degree
of competition in an industry (e.g. the Herfindahl index, price cost margins, etc.) are not
monotonic in the level of competition as measured by the relevant parameter. He then propose
a new empirical measure based on profit ratios.
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efficiency x, and condition IVE (Increasing VE) requires it to be increasing in
the level of competition, while condition DVE (Decreasing VE) requires it to
be decreasing in φ. According to IVE, then, to be more efficient is more impor-
tant in a more competitive environment in the sense that the marginal value
of efficiency is larger in more competitive environment6. The opposite is true
according to DVE. None of these conditions are to be intended as an exact char-
acterization of how the strength of competition in the product market affects
firm profitability. The idea of (imperfect) competition is indeed a vague one.
It refers to the existence of some kind of rivalry among firms that strategically
interact in their product market but the exact nature of such rivalry, as well as
its intensity and consequences, have to be better specified in any particular con-
text. Broadly speaking, competition has both an exogenous and an endogenous
component. There are characteristics in the product market such as entry fees,
size, substitutability among different brands of the same product, transparency,
the eventual threat of a potential entrant etc., that naturally affect the strength
of the firm competition within an industry. These elements are, to a large ex-
tent, exogenous and, in this model, I exactly refers to this kind of determinants
of the market competitiveness. However, the number of firms in any particular
industry as well as their respective market shares are important determinants
of the degree of competition and, of course, they are endogenous. I will not
attempt to consider this other aspect of competition in this paper. In principle,
the exogenous characteristics of a market determines its endogenous structure
so that changes in the first can affect the second and the overall effect will be
the sum of the two. Hence, it is incomplete to analyze only the effects of the
exogenous elements but this is a first step toward a better understanding of the
whole process. Of course, changes in the exogenous structure that do not affect
the number of firms find here a complete treatment.
2.2 Analysis of the Equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium that will be used is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,
which will be simply referred to as the equilibrium. A pure strategy for a firm
specifies in each period a wage offer for each manager on the labor market
as a function of the observed history of the game.7 A pure strategy for a
manager has to specify in each period which offer to accept (if any) and the
level of effort to exert in case he is hired by a firm as a function of the past
observed history of the game. I will only consider pure strategies equilibria.
Players also have beliefs about managerial talents. In period one everybody
shares the same priors described above. The (possible) observation of the first
period efficiency parameters then allows to update such beliefs in period two.
6Note that for each pair (x, y) the difference |π(φ, x, y)− π(φ, y, x)| measures the value of
the most efficient manager and condition IVE implies that such quantity is strictly increasing
in φ. This latter condition closely resembles the selection effect of increased competition found
by Boone (2000) in his examples, but it is here expressed in terms of differences in profits
rather than profit ratios.
7Hence, If a manager doesn’t work in period one he won’t be on the labor market in period
two so that, after any such history, firms cannot make any wage offer to such manager.
8
The process of belief revision taking place after the observation of first period
efficiency parameters depends on the amount of effort that manager i is expected
to exert in period one, say bei,1. Given (1) and given such expectation, the
observation of xi,1 is equivalent to the observation of:
zi,1 = ηi + εi,1 = xi,1 − eˆi,1.
A simple process of normal learning then takes place and the updated belief
about manager i’s ability is ηi/xi,1 ∼ N(τzi,1, τσ2ε), where τ =
σ2η
σ2η+σ
2
ε
is the
signal to noise ratio. Note that manager i could choose in principle ei,1 6= eˆi,1
so distorting the market learning process about his talent. In such a case, from
manager i’s standpoint, it would result that ηi/xi,1 ∼ N(τ(zi,1+ei,1−eˆi,1), τσ2ε)
which first order stochastic dominates the previous one as long as ei,1 > eˆi,1.
In equilibrium firms have rational expectations in the sense that they correctly
anticipate the level of effort chosen by the managers.
Given eˆi,1 and eˆj,1, if both managers are hired in period one, the firm hiring
manager i has first period expected gross profits given by:
Πi,1 = E(ε1,η)
£
π(φ, ηi + eˆi,1 + εi,1, ηj + eˆj,1 + εj,1)
¤
,
while if only manager i is hired in period one his principal first period expected
gross profits are:
Π¯i,1 = E(ε1,η) [π(φ, ηi + eˆi,1 + εi,1)] ,
where the expectations above are evaluated at the beginning of period one and
take into account the prior distribution of the random variable η = (ηi, ηj).
It is immediate to recognize that in period two a hired manager has no
incentive to provide a positive level of effort, that is, ei,2 = ej,2 = 0. Hence, if
both managers are rehired in period two, the firm hiring manager i has expected
second period gross profits given by:
Πi,2 = E(ε2,η)
£
π(φ, ηi + εi,2, ηj + εj,2)/x1
¤
.
From the other hand, if only manager i is rehired in t = 2, his principal has
expected second period profits, gross of wage payments, given by:
Π¯i,2 = E(εi,2,ηi) [π(φ, ηi + εi,2)/xi,1] ,
where these second period expectations are evaluated at the beginning of period
two using the distribution of η = (ηi, ηj) resulting after the observation of
x1 = (xi,1, xj,1).
In period two, after the observation of first period efficiencies, managers are
no longer homogeneous in terms of their talent, even if they are both expected
to exert no effort. Furthermore, firms compete à la Bertrand to hire the most
skilled of them so that they will end up paying out to the good manager a wage
premium that completely exhausts the profit differential he is able to produce
in the product market. This intuition is shown in the following two lemmas.
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Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, firms earn the same amount of expected net prof-
its in each subgame starting at the beginning of period two.
Proof. There are three different types of subgames starting at the beginning
of period two. First, in subgames following histories where no manager was
hired in the first period both firms obtain π(φ) with probability one. Second, in
subgames following histories where exactly one manager was hired in the first
period (say manager i), at least one principal won’t be able to hire a manager in
period two and her profits will be π(φ). Let Π¯i,2−wi,2 be the expected profits of
the other principal when she hires the manager with a salary wi,2 ≥ w (note that
in equilibrium it is not possible that the manager turns out to be unemployed
in period two). If wi,2 > Π¯i,2−π(φ) the principal hiring the manager would
prefer not to hire him and if wi,2 < Π¯i2−π(φ) the principal hiring no manager
could make a wage offer w + ε that for ε ∈ (0, Π¯i2 − π(φ) − wi,2) attracts the
manager and allows the deviating firm to increase its profits. Hence it must be
wi,2 = Π¯i,2−π(φ). Finally in subgames following histories where both managers
were hired in the first period, they are rehired in the following period in any
equilibrium. Hence, let wi,2 and wj,2 be their salaries in period two, it must be
shown that:
Πi,2 − wi,2 = Πj,2 − wj,2.
Assume by contradiction that Πi,2−wi,2 > Πj,2−wj,2, i.e. it is more profitable
to hire manager i. There must be at least one principal hiring manager j with
positive probability and she could attract manager i with probability one by
offering him a slightly higher wage, say wi2 + ε (ε > 0) and withdrawing at the
same time the wage offered to manager j, such a deviation is convenient for
each ε < 12(Πi,2−wi,2)−
1
2(Πj,2−wj,2). A similar contradiction arises from the
alternative assumption Πi − wi,2 < Πj − wj,2 and this completes the proof.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium both managers are hired in both periods. Further-
more, the wage earned by manager i in period one is independent of ei,1 while
the wage he earns in period two is given by8 :
wi,2 = w + (Πi,2 −Πj,2) I(xi,1 ≥ xj,1),
Proof. Let’s show first that both managers are employed in period one. If,
by contradiction, manager i doesn’t work in the first period, his lifetime utility
is 2w and at least a firm is earning π(φ) in the same period. Lemma 1 then
implies that such a principal will not be able to earn more than π(φ) in period
two either, so that to offer w + ε to manager i in period one is a profitable
deviation for each ε ∈ (0,Πi,1−π(φ)), because she attracts manager i with such
an offer and obtains strictly larger expected net profits. Hence both managers
are hired in the first period and this immediately implies that they are both
hired also in period two. To obtain the expression of wi,2 consider first the
situation in which xi,1 < xj,1. Let’s show that in this case wi,2 = w. Assume by
8Thereafter I’ll use the notation I(E) to denote the indicator function of an event E, that
is, I(E) = 1 if E is true and I(E) = 0 otherwise.
10
contradiction that wi2 > w (note that it cannot be wi2 < w in any equilibrium)
and consider the following alternative bid for the principal hiring manager i:
the offer made to manager i is slightly reduced while the other is kept constant.
With such a strategy she will still end up hiring manager i but at a smaller wage
and then she has an incentive to deviate. Similarly, if xi,1 > xj,1 then wj,2 = w.
Note also that if xi,1 = xj,1, then Πi,2 = Πj,2, so that it must be wi,2 = wj,2 = w
since there’s no need for a firm to offer more in order to hire one of the two
perfectly homogeneous managers. Together with lemma 1 and the fact that
both managers always work at a firm, this last result immediately implies the
expression given for wi,2. To complete the proof it remains to show that wi,1
doesn’t depend on ei,t but this is trivially true since firms cannot observe effort
levels (however the wage offers in the first period do depend on bei,1 and bej,1).
Lemma 2 makes it clear that there are two reasons for a manager to build a
career, through the exertion of some positive level of effort in the first period.
First of all, a manager can earn more than the reservation wage only if he
performs better than the other one and, second, the wage premium that the
best manager obtains increases with his perceived ability.
Note also that the lemma also suggests the existence of what could be called
an "implicit lagged relative performance evaluation": the wage earned by a
manager in period two depends on his relative performance in period one, and
this is not an explicit contractual arrangements but simply a consequence of
the firm equilibrium behavior in the model. This seems to be an interesting
empirical prediction that would be worth analyzing.
The fact that in this model the best manager completely appropriates the
extra profits he is able to produce may seem quite extreme. In a more realistic
model firms would retain part of such profits but, what is really at stake here
is how the competitiveness of the firms’ product market shapes the managerial
incentives to build a career. The previous lemma, then, simply suggests that
such incentives depend on how profitable to hire a good manager is, which in
turn depends on the characteristics of the product market. It seems reasonable
to expect that in markets where the profits a firm can realize are not strongly
linked to its efficiency, the incentives for managers to build a career are probably
not very high. To make this point more explicit consider de following quantities:
zi,1 = ηi + εi1 ∼ N(0, σ2η + σ2ε);
zi,2 = ηi + εi2 ∼ N(τ(zi,1 + ei,1 − eˆi,1), (1 + τ)σ2ε);
zj,1 = ηi + εi1 ∼ N(0, σ2η + σ2ε);
zj,2 = ηi + εi2 ∼ N(τzj,1, (1 + τ)σ2ε).
Their interpretation is as follows: zi,1 and zj,1 are simply the sum of the un-
known talent and the noise term in the first period for manager i and, respec-
tively, manager j. Note in particular that the distributions of such quantities
are those commonly held at the beginning of period one and are independent
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of managers’ choice of effort. From the other hand the quantity zi,2 repre-
sents manager i’s ability plus the second period noise, and its distribution is
conditioned on the first period information (here summarized by zi,1) in the
hypothesis that manager i exerts effort ei,1 while he is expected to exert effort
eˆi,1. The quantity zj,2 has a similar meaning for manager j but its distribution is
computed assuming that her effort choice is correctly anticipated (and is equal
to eˆj,1). Hence, by increasing the effort he provides manager i can bias firms’
learning process making the distribution over his ability in period two better,
in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. Of course, in equilibrium the
manager will not fool the market.
In terms of the notation just defined, manager i is paid above his reservation
wage in period two if and only if zi,1 ≥ zj,1 + eˆi,1 − ei,1, furthermore, the wage
premium that he obtains in such an event can be written as follows:
wp(φ, zi,1 + ei,1 − eˆ1, zj.1) = E(zi,2,zj,2) [π(φ, zi,2, zj,2)− π(φ, zj,2, zi,2)] .
Note that this quantity is twice continuously differentiable. The following
lemma summarizes some of its most useful properties.
Lemma 3 For each (φ, u, v) ∈ Φ×R2 it results that wp(φ, v, v) = 0, wp2(φ, u, v) >
0. Furthermore, if condition IVE is satisfied, then wp12(φ, v, u) > 0, while, if
condition DVE is satisfied, then wp12(φ, v, u) < 0.
Proof. The fact that wp(φ, v, v) = 0 for each φ and v, immediately fol-
lows from the definition of the function wp. To show the remaining state-
ments in the lemma, take the random variables x ∼ N(τu, (1 + τ)σ2ε) and
y ∼ N(τv, (1 + τ)σ2ε), then consider the quantities:
wp(φ, u, v) = E(x,y) [π(φ, x, y)− π(φ, y, x)]
wp1(φ, u, v) = E(x,y) [π1(φ, x, y)− π1(φ, y, x)]
The difference π(φ, x, y)−π(φ, y, x) is strictly increasing in x, while the difference
π1(φ, x, y)−π1(φ, y, x) is strictly increasing in x if condition IVE is satisfied and
it is strictly decreasing in x if condition (DVE) is satisfied. Since a larger value
for u induces a strictly dominant distribution on x (in the sense of first order
stochastic dominance), the sign of wp2 and wp12 are those claimed in the lemma.
At the beginning of period one manager i’s expected wage in period two can
then be written as follows:
w(φ, ei,1 − eˆi,1) = w +E(zi,1,zj1) [wp(φ, zi,1 + ei,1 − eˆi,1, zj1)I(zi,1 + ei,1 − eˆi,1 ≥ zj,1)] =
w +
Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
v+eˆ1−ei,1
wp(φ, u+ ei,1 − eˆi,1, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v).
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The above quantity, which is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave in ei,1, can be used to characterize the equilibrium effort exerted
in the first period. This is done in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium the two managers choose in the first period
the same level of effort e1(φ) which is uniquely identified by the condition:Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
v
wp2(φ, u, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v) = g
0(e1(φ)). (3)
Proof. The level of effort that manager i exerts in period one can only affect
his expected wage in period two, hence his choice solves the problem:
max
ei,1∈[0,e¯]
w(φ, ei,1 − eˆi,1)− g(ei,1).
The solution e∗(eˆi,1) exists and maps [0, e¯] into itself. Since for each eˆi,1 ∈ [0, e¯]
it results that
w0(−eˆ1)− g0(0) =
Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
v+eˆ1
wp2(φ, u− eˆi,1, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v) > 0
w0(e¯− eˆ1)− g0(e¯) = −∞,
such solution must be interior and then it is identified by the first order condition
w0(φ, e∗(eˆi,1) − eˆi,1) = g0(e∗(eˆi,1)). Furthermore, the equilibrium effort chosen
by manager i must be correctly anticipated by the firms, i.e. it must be a
fixed point of the function e∗(e). When the objective function in the above
maximization problem is not concave, such a fixed point, call it ei,1(φ), may
fail to exist, and then it would not be possible to obtain an equilibrium in pure
strategy. However, when such fixed point exists, it is the unique solution to the
equation w0(φ, 0) = g0(ei,1(φ)) which can be written as follows:Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
v
wp2(φ, u, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v) = g
0(ei,1(φ)) (4)
Note also that the equilibrium effort level chosen by manager j is similarly
characterized by:Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
v
wp2(φ, u, v)dFzj,1(u)dFzi,1(v) = g
0(ej,1(φ)). (5)
Since the random variables zi,1 and zj,1 are identically distributed, conditions 4
and 5 both coincide with condition 3. This shows the statement in the propo-
sition.
Note that in equilibrium firms correctly anticipate the managerial effort in
the first period so that it cannot affect the expected wage that a young manager
will earn in period two. In fact, such quantity can be computed as follows:
w∗ = w(φ, 0) = w +
Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
v
wp(φ, u, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v) (6)
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The above proposition characterizes the level of effort that managers choose
in equilibrium in the first period. Such an effort, that can be considered as a
proxy for the X-efficiency within the industry at hand, depends on the level of
competition in the product market. Hence,implicitly differentiating expression 3
with respect to φ one can evaluate how competition affects managerial incentives
to build a career:
e01(φ) =
R∞
−∞
R∞
v
wp12(φ, u, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v)
g00(φ)
. (7)
Given the results in lemma 3, the comparative static properties stated in the
following proposition are immediately established.
Proposition 2 If condition IVE is satisfied then e01(φ) > 0, while If condition
DVE is satisfied then e01(φ) < 0.
Note that the VE conditions are sufficient but by no means necessary for
the result in the above proposition. In particular situations, weaker versions of
them could suffice. For example, consider the following weak version of the VE
conditions:
Condition 3 (IVE-W) For each (x, y) with x > y, the difference π2(φ, x, y)−
π3(φ, y, x) is strictly increasing in φ.
Condition 4 (DVE-W) For each (x, y) with x > y, the difference π2(φ, x, y)−
π3(φ, y, x) is strictly decreasing in φ.
In other terms condition IVE-W requires that the derivative π1(φ, x, y) −
π1(φ, y, x) be increasing in x in the hemiplane x > y only. Similarly, condition
DVE-W requires that π1(φ, x, y)−π1(φ, y, x) be decreasing in x only for x > y.
Proposition 3 If condition IVE-W is satisfied, then it exists σ+ > 0 such that
σ2ε < σ
+ =⇒ e1(φ) > 0. Similarly, If condition DVE-W is satisfied, then it
exists σ− > 0 such that σ2ε < σ
− =⇒ e01(φ) < 0.
Proof. I only show the first statement of the proposition, the second one is
similar. Let’s proceed in two steps.
Step 1 I first show that, if σ2ε = 0 and condition IVE-W is satisfied then it
results e01(φ) > 0. Given an expectation eˆ1 on the first period effort, the obser-
vation of xi 1 perfectly reveals the efficiency of manager i which is ηi = xi 1− eˆ1.
By choosing a different level of effort, say ei,1, manager i could induce the mar-
ket to believe him of talent ηi + ei,1 − eˆ1 and then the expected second period
wage for manager i can be written as follows:
w(ei,1 − eˆ1) = w+
+
Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
v+eˆ1−ei,1
π(φ, u+ ei,1 − eˆ1, v)− π(φ, v, u+ ei,1 − eˆ1)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v).
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Thus, the first period equilibrium effort e1(φ) is characterized by:
g0(e1(φ)) =
Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
v
π2(φ, u, v)− π3(φ, v, u)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v),
from which, implicitly differentiating, one obtains:
e01(φ) =
R∞
−∞
R∞
v
π1,2(φ, u, v)− π1,3(φ, v, u)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v)
g00(e1(φ))
(8)
so that the claim in step 1 immediately follows from condition IVE-W.
Step 2 To complete the proof, consider the numerator of the right side of
7 and note that it is a continuous function of the parameter σ2ε, converging to
the numerator of the right side of 8 as σ2ε → 0.
Proposition 3 simply states that under a substantial weaker version of the
VE conditions, the same result as in proposition 1 holds, provided that in period
two the residual uncertainty on the managerial talent is small enough.
What is really relevant for the managerial career concerns is then the marginal
value of efficiency. A change in the market conditions that increases the marginal
value of an efficient manager also increases the incentive to build a good repu-
tation. This is so in this model, because in the second period labor market, the
good manager fully appropriates of the value of his (possibly) larger efficiency
measured here by the difference in profits that he is able to produce. This result
closely resembles proposition 4 in Schmidt (1997). A major difference consists
in the source of managerial incentives: in this model they indirectly arises from
career concerns while in the paper by Schmidt explicit contingent contract are
used.
More competitive product markets are usually thought of as inducing smaller
profits (e.g. smaller price-cost margins) to the firms. However, contrary to the
models of Schmidt (1997) and Hermalin (1992), the amount of profits doesn’t
play any role in the present context. This wouldn’t be so if managers were
not assumed to be risk neutral. With more general managerial preferences,
an income effect and a risk adjustment effect similar to those described by
Hermalin (1992) would arise both with ambiguous sign. An explicit possibility
of bankruptcy, with an associated turn over cost for the manager involved,
would also create a scope for the amount of profits to the extent that, as it
seems reasonable, smaller profits rise the probability of going out of business.
As in Schmidt (1997), an increased probability of bankruptcy would naturally
rise the managerial incentives in the first period.
In this model the bargaining power that managers with a good reputation
acquires on the labor market has a key role: they are interested in building a
career only to the extent that they can capture the value of such reputation.
Any element that negatively affects their bargaining power, as for example the
existence of switching costs for a manager who decides to change firm, eventually
in the form of lost specific human capital, would then reduce their incentives.
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Note also that the results in this paragraph especially holds for managers at
the top level in the firm hierarchy. In fact, at lower levels career concerns are
mainly driven by the internal labor market, that is, by the possibility of getting
better employment conditions within the same firm. An interesting and related
issue would then be to evaluate how competitive pressure in the product market
affects the internal labor market of a firm and, then, the incentives throughout
the firm structure.
As a final remark, note that it is not clear in this setting whether the equi-
librium level of effort in the first period is too high or too low with respect to
the efficient level. Of course, the second period effort is too low for sure but
this depends on the fact that there isn’t any future after period two and then,
there isn’t any scope for building a career. Efficiency here has to be defined
with respect to profits, namely we could say that the efficient (symmetric) level
of effort in period t is eFBt defined as follows:
eFBt ∈ argmax
0≤e≤e¯
Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
−∞
π(φ, u, v) + π(φ, v, u)dFx(e)i,t(u)dFx(e)j,t(v)− 2g(e).
(9)
Here the distribution of period t efficiencies x(e)i,t and x(e)j,t take into account
all past information and assume that managers provide the level of effort e. The
first order necessary and sufficient condition characterizing this first best effort
level is then:
∂
∂e
Z ∞
−∞
Z ∞
−∞
π(φ, u, v) + π(φ, v, u)dFx(eFB)i,t(u)dFx(eFB)j,t(v) = 2g
0(eFB).
(10)
Comparing condition 10, defining the first best level of effort, with condition 3
defining the equilibrium first period effort, it is not clear at all whether young
managers are overworking or shirking too much. Furthermore, in this model the
discount factor is for simplicity assumed to be one, namely that the future is
as important as the present in determining the lifetime utility of agents. More
generally, however, a small enough discount factor could induce young managers
to provide an amount of effort below the efficient level. But in a model with
a finite horizon like this, it could also be the case that "the future" is more
important than "the present" so that the discount factor could be larger than
one. A large enough discount factor could then induce managers to overwork.
3 Examples
In this section I discuss some examples of explicit market games. Propositions
2 and 3 directly allow to evaluate the impact of specific market parameters on
managerial incentives within the industry. In the first two examples I consider
firms producing a homogeneous good and competing à la Cournot with a lin-
ear demand, in the first place, and then with an Isoelastic demand. The third
example is very common in IO and it represents the easiest way of modeling
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price competition among firms producing differentiated products. The last ex-
ample analyzes the effect of a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition. A
common feature of all the examples is that a larger market size corresponds to
stronger incentives. A more complete analysis would allow for an endogenous
market structure. This possibility is partially pursued in the first example where
the number of firms and their market shares is in fact endogenous, even if only
two of them can potentially employ a manager9.
3.1 Cournot Competition with Linear Demand
There’s a continuum of mass n of entrepreneurial firms (EF), i.e. firms run di-
rectly by their owner, and 2 managerial firms (MF), i.e. firms run by a manager.
They compete choosing the quantity to sell on the product market and the in-
verse demand function is given by p(Q) = A−Q, where Q = qi+qj+
R n
0
q(h)dh
is the aggregate production, being q(h) the "production intensity" of a generic
EF h ∈ [0, n] and (qi, qj) the quantities produced by the two MF. The parameter
A > 0 measures the size of the market. Each EF has a constant marginal cost
equal to c > 0, while a MF has a marginal cost of κ(x), where x denotes its
manager efficiency and κ is a positive and decreasing function bounded above
by c. Assuming that the parameters always allow for an interior solution (i.e.
A ≥ 3c), the profit function for a MF managed with efficiency x and competing
against n EF and a MF of efficiency y is:
π(x, y) =
·
A+ nc+ κ(y)− (n+ 2)κ(x)
n+ 3
¸2
.
The function π is increasing in x and decreasing in y, strictly and it is
possible to choose the function κ in such a way that the convexity properties
required for π are satisfied. The parameter φ could be here identified with n, A
or c. Furthermore it results that:
π(x, y)− π(y, x) = n
2 + 4n+ 3
(n+ 3)2
£
κ
2(x)− κ2(y)
¤
+
2A− 2nc
(n+ 3)
[κ(y)− κ(x)]
and then it is possible to obtain:
∂
∂A
[π(x, y)− π(y, x)] = 2 [κ(y)− κ(x)]
n+ 3
∂
∂c
[π(x, y)− π(y, x)] = 2n [κ(y)− κ(x)]
n+ 3
∂
∂n
[π(x, y)− π(y, x)] = 2
(n+ 3)
2
£
κ2(x)− κ2(y)
¤
−2(A− 3c)
(n+ 3)
2 [κ(y)− κ(x)].
Note that the derivatives of the difference π(x, y) − π(y, x) with respect
to A and with respect to c are both strictly increasing functions of x so that
9This is a major limitation indeed, because the market structure does not directly affect
the managerial labor market.
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condition IVE is satisfied in those cases. Hence, a larger market or less efficient
entrepreneurial competitors induce larger incentives to build a career. It is also
possible to compute
∂2
∂n∂x
[π(x, y)− π(y, x)] = 2
(n+ 3)2
κ0(x) [2κ(x) +A− 3c]
which is for sure a negative quantity whenever A ≥ 3c, then, since this is always
the case in any interior solution, the more EF are in the market the smaller the
implicit incentives created by career concerns10 .
To make the market structure endogenous consider the existence of a fixed
entry cost F > 011 . Notice that since the MF are always more efficient than
any EF and the profit function is increasing in own efficiency, if an EF is in the
market then the two MF are also in the market. Restrict attention to a range
of parameters that allow the entrance of at least one EF. Let n∗ = n(A, c, F )
be the number of EF which optimally decide to enter as a function of the
other parameters; of course n∗ increasing in A, and decreasing in both c and
F. It is now possible to evaluate the impact of A, c or F on the managerial
indirect incentives in case of endogenous market structure. A decrease in the
entry cost increases the number of EF so that indirectly reduces the managerial
incentives. Usually a market protected by a smaller entry cost is considered as
a more competitive one but this example shows that it also tends to be less
efficient12. The impact of changes in the other parameters is now ambiguous:
for example, a larger market size would in principle increases incentives but the
entrance of more EF in the market tend to outweighs this effect and the final
result cannot be predicted.
3.2 Cournot Competition with Isoelastic Demand
Consider a Cournot duopoly in the market for a homogeneous good whose in-
verse demand function is p(Q) =
³
A
Q
´ 1
ε
, where, again, Q = qi + qj is the total
quantity produced by firms i and j, and ε > 1 is the constant elasticity of the
demand function. Firm i marginal cost is constant and is given by κ(x) where
x denotes its manager efficiency and κ is a positive and decreasing function.
The profit function for a firm of efficiency x competing with a firm of effi-
ciency y is then the following:
π(x, y) =
A (2ε− 1)ε−1 [(1− ε)κ(x) + εκ(y)]2
εε [κ(x) + κ(y)]ε+1
;
10This result is similar to the one found by Martin (1993). He considers a model of Cournot
competition among firm run by a manager and in which incentives are provided through
explicit contingent contracts. He finds that the optimal effort induced in equilibrium decreases
with the number of firms.
11This entry cost has to be paid at the beginning of period one and allows to remain in the
market for two periods.
12Raith (2004) also finds that a smaller entry cost reduces efficiency and for the same reason:
the presence of a larger number of firms tend to reduce incentives.
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where parameters are assumed to be such that no corner solutions arise, i.e. it
is assumed that ε < supκsupκ−inf k .
Note that the function π is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing in
x, strictly decreasing in y. The parameter φ can here be identified either with
A or ε. It is immediate to compute:
π(x, y)− π(y, x) = A
·
(2ε− 1)
ε [κ(x) + κ(y)]
¸ε
[κ(y)− κ(x)]
which can be shown to be a strictly increasing function of x and a strictly
decreasing function of y. It is then possible to compute:
∂
∂A
[π(x, y)− π(y, x)] =
·
(2ε− 1)
ε [κ(x) + κ(y)]
¸ε
[κ(y)− κ(x)]
∂
∂ε
[π(x, y)− π(y, x)]=A [κ(y)− κ(x)]
·
(2ε− 1)
ε [κ(x) + κ(y)]
¸ε ·
ln
2ε− 1
ε [κ(x) + κ(y)]
+
1
2ε− 1
¸
.
The former of such derivatives is a strictly increasing function of x so that
condition IVE is satisfied, meaning that a larger market size induces managers
to exert more effort. From the other hand, the latter derivative is not monotone
so that the impact of a more elastic demand on the managerial incentives cannot
be predicted unambiguously. As in Willig (1987) a smaller market size tends to
reduce managerial incentives but an increased demand elasticity has not a well
defined effect here. The point is that at the equilibrium for firm i it results that:
p− ci
p
=
1
ε
qi
Q
;
so that a larger value of the elasticity parameter has not a well defined effect
on profits (and on profit differentials). In fact, the most efficient firm will be
able to get a larger market share if the demand is more elastic but this doesn’t
ensure that the overall profits increases. However, it is possible to note that if
supκ < 1 the quantity ∂
∂ε
[π(x, y)− π(y, x)] is the product of three positive and
increasing function of x and then it is strictly increasing in x in the hemiplane
x > y. Condition IVE-W is satisfied and it is possible to conclude that, if the
residual uncertainty is small enough, an increased demand elasticity improves
managerial incentives. The intuition is that in such a case there cannot be a
big difference between an efficient and inefficient firm (recall that κ is a positive
function) so that the effect of a changing elasticity on the market shares is not
very important and it is dominated by the "direct" effect on profits, which is
the only one showing up in the model by Willig.
3.3 Differentiated Products
In the spirit of Hotelling 1929, consider a liner city of length 1 where consumers
are uniformly distributed with density A. Two firms are located at the opposite
ends of the city and they sell the same good. The first firm location is at s = 0
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and the other firm is located at s = 1. Consumers’ demand can be either one
or zero and v > 0 denotes their common valuation for the good. To move from
their location to one of the firm, consumers incur a transportation cost of t for
unit of length. Firm hiring manager i has constant marginal cost ci = κ(xi) < c.
To fix notation assume that manager i is hired by the firm located at zero while
the other firm is hiring manager j. Competition is in prices and, if (pi, pj) are the
prices charged by the two firms, to buy one unit of the good the consumer located
at s faces a total cost of pi+ ts or of pj+ t(1− s) depending on whether he goes
to firm i or to firm j. The consumer located at s(pi, pj) = 12+
pj−pi
2t is indifferent
between the two firms so that those located at his left prefer to buy from firm
i and those located to his right prefer to buy from firm j. The parameter t
is traditionally interpreted as a measure of the product substitutability: the
smaller is t the closer substitute the two products are. Competition among
firms producing closer substitutes is usually considered to be tougher so that
it is quite natural to interpret a decrease in t as an increase in competition.
However, as in the other examples, it is also interesting to evaluate the impact
of the parameter A on the managerial incentives. Assuming that v is large
enough to ensure that, in equilibrium, each consumer is always willing to buy
one unit of the good , the profit function of a firm having efficiency x and
competing with a firm of efficiency y is:
π(x, y) =



A [κ(y)− κ(x)− t] if κ(x) < κ(y)− 3t
A
18t [3t+ κ(y)− κ(x)]
2 if |κ(x)− κ(y)| ≤ 3t
0 if κ(x) > κ(y) + 3t
Note that only when |κ(x)− κ(y)| ≤ 3t both firms are producing a positive
amount of goods while in the other cases the most efficient firm only is suppling
the whole market. If κ is decreasing then the profit function π(x, y) satisfies
all the properties stated in section 2 but it doesn’t have partial derivatives, and
then it is not differentiable, in the region {(x, y) : |κ(x)− κ(y)| = 3t}. However,
this region has measure zero in the real plane so that all the results in the
previous section still go through with the exception of proposition three that
requires continuity of partial derivatives of π. It is possible to obtain:
∂
∂x
[π(x, y)− π(y, x)] = −Aκ0(x)
·
2
3
+
1
3
I(|κ(x)− κ(y)| > 3t)
¸
.
The above quantity is strictly increasing in A and then a larger market size
increases the managerial incentive to build a career. However, it doesn’t depend
on t if the parameter configuration only allows for an interior solution, i.e.
supκ − inf κ ≤ 3t. This corresponds to a situation in which firm efficiency
doesn’t make a big difference (the possible cost reductions are small compared
to transportation costs) but when corner solutions are possible, i.e. supκ −
inf κ > 3t, the above derivative is a decreasing function of t for any (x, y).
Hence, provided that firm efficiency is important enough, an increased product
substitutability makes managerial career concerns sharper13 .
13These results seem to be robust to alternative specification of the transportation cost, as
long as it is the same for each consumer. For example, using a convex transportation cost as
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3.4 A Switch from Cournot to Bertrand Competition
An increase in competitive pressure is sometimes represented by a switch from
Cournot to Bertrand competition. In order to analyze how such a change af-
fects the managerial career concerns let’s consider a market with linear de-
mand P (Q) = A − Q in which two firms compete in prices with probability
q and in quantities with probability (1 − q). As above, each firm has constant
marginal cost equal to κ(x) where x is its managerial efficiency and κ is a pos-
itive and decreasing function bounded above by some value c > 0. Of course,
this is a fictitious market, but it exactly reproduces the Bertrand game when
q = 1 and the Cournot game when q = 0. Assume that parameter values are
such that both firms produce a positive quantity in the Cournot competition
(i.e. A > 2 supκ − inf κ) and that in the Bertrand competition the less effi-
cient firm’s marginal cost is always below its competitor monopoly price (i.e.
A > 3 supκ,note that this last condition implies the previous one). With these
restrictions the profit function in case of Cournot and Bertrand competition are
respectively:
πC(x, y) =
·
A+ κ(y)− 2κ(x)
3
¸2
πB(x, y) =
½
[A− κ(y)] [κ(y)− κ(x)]
0
if x > y
if x ≤ y.
Hence the overall profit function is:
π(x, y) = qπB(x, y) + (1− q)πC(x, y).
It is then possible to compute14:
∂2
∂x∂q
[π(x, y)− π(y, x)] =



−κ0(x)
h
A+2κ(x)−3κ(y)
3
i
−κ0(x)
h
A+3κ(y)−4κ(y)
3
i if x > y
if x < y.
The last quantity is always strictly positive as long as A > 4 supκ. Under this
restriction then, the IVE condition is satisfied and an increase in the probability
q induces managers to exert a larger effort in the first period. In particular, this
means that in a Bertrand game career concerns are sharper then in a Cournot
game, provided that the market size is large enough15.
4 The Threat of a Hostile Takeover
The model developed so far has been useful to asses the impact of exogenous
characteristics of the product market on the managerial career concerns. It has
c(x) = tx2 or a concave one as c(x) = t(2x− x2) exactly yields the same results.
14As in the previous example, the function π is not differentiable everywhere. In this case
π doesn’t have partial derivatives along the line y = x but such a region has measure zero in
the real plane and all the previous results, but proposition three, still hold.
15 Similarly to the previous example, the profit function is not differentiable along the line
x = y, but this region has measure zero in the (x, y) plane so that all the results established
in the text, with the exception of proposition 3, still hold.
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already been argued that the impact of the managerial labor market is at least as
important but the model is not suited to directly address such issue. However,
in this section I will discuss how the managerial labor market can be affected by
the presence of a potential raider that, after observing managerial performances
in the first period, may decide to enter the industry acquiring control of one
of the two firms. In this way the model allows to evaluate the impact of a
takeover threat on the first period incentives and on the (second period) level of
managerial compensation. It is usually thought that the existence of a potential
raider increases ex-ante incentives (see for example Scharfstein 1988 b) but this
is not so in the present context. It will also been shown that takeover threats
reduce managerial compensation.
4.1 The Role of a Potential raider
Let’s introduce, then, a new player called the raider (he). He remains silent
during the first period but he can observe the realized managerial efficiencies
and, at the beginning of period two, he may identify one of the two firms as his
target and then make a tender offer. The tender offer will succeed with proba-
bility α ∈ [0, 1] , whose exact value depends on the strength of the antitakeover
legislation: the stronger such legislation the lower the value of α. With α = 0
the model doesn’t allow any takeover, so exactly reproducing the situation de-
scribed in the previous section. If a takeover is realized the raider will directly
run the firm he acquired with an efficiency zR that I assume to be distribute
as a N(τr, (1 + τ)σ2ε). Hence, the precision of the raider knowledge of his own
efficiency is exactly the same as the senior managers’16, so that the distribution
of zR first order stochastically dominates that of the second period efficiency
of manager i if and only if his past performance was zi,1 < r. In running the
firm he has taken over, the raider gives up alternative opportunities that, for
simplicity, I assume to be worth w¯ . If a takeover is not observed events develop
exactly has in the previous section: the two firms compete in the managerial
labor market to hire a manager, then, managers decides the level of effort to
exert (so determining their efficiency up to a stochastic term) and, finally, prod-
uct market competition takes place. If, on the contrary, a takeover is observed
there will be only one firm on the managerial labor market in period two but
thereafter events are as above.
The time structure in period two is then the following:
1. The potential raider decides to which firm (if any) address the tender offer.
2. If a tender offer is made, the target firm is taken over with probability
α ∈ [0, 1] ,
3.a. In case of no takeover both firms bid to hire a manager.
3.b. In case a firm is taken over only the other firm bids to hire a manager.
16This could depend on the raider’s past experience having brought some information on
his talent.
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4. The hired manager(s) decide the level of effort to exert and the efficiency
parameter(s) is (are) determined according to 1.
5. Product market competition takes place.
Firms’ and managers’ preferences are as in the previous section while the
raider is assumed to maximize his expected profit.
A pure strategy for the raider specifies which firm to make the tender offer
(if any) as a function of the observed managerial efficiencies in the first period.
The equilibrium concept to be used is still the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Going backward, the hired manager(s) in period two will not exert any effort,
as in the previous section. What is really crucial to be analyzed here, is the
equilibrium wage(s) of the hired manager(s) in period two.
If a takeover doesn’t occur, we can still apply the analysis of the previous
section: in particular lemma 1 still holds and determines the equilibrium wages
of both managers in period two. However, if a takeover does occur, the firm
which has not been taken over is now the only bidder on the managerial labor
market and will optimally hire the best manager at the reservation wage. This
characteristic of the model may appear quite extreme and indeed somehow un-
natural: the occurrence of a takeover has a very heavy external effect on the best
manager who completely loose the wage premium that he would have earned
in case no takeover were observed. However, the point that I want to stress
here is that an external effect of this kind, even if not of this magnitude, in any
case emerges. If a firm is taken over the managerial bargaining power on the
labor market is somehow weakened: either because less bidders remain or, if the
raider participates the labor market, he has a better alternative to the hiring of
a manager and then a stronger bargaining position.
Going one step backward, the decision of making a tender offer has to be
analyzed. Given that, in case of a takeover, the other firm will end up hiring
the best manager,and assuming that manager i resulted the best, the raider
anticipates that his post-takeover profits will be17: E(zR, zi,2)
£
π(zR, zi,2)
¤
. The
price that the raider has to pay to acquire control of a firm is the expected
profits of that firm in case of no takeover (net of any managerial compensation)
but in this model such quantities are exactly the same since firms are paying
their managers all the extra profits they are able to produce18. Assuming again
that i was the best manager in the first period, a tender offer, made to any of
the two firms, would then imply a cost, in case of success, which is given by
E(zi,2, zj,2) [π(zj,2, zi,2)] − w¯. The raider would then decide to make the offer if
and only if:
E(zi,2, zR)
£
π(zR, zi,2)
¤
−
©
E(zi,2, zj,2) [π(zj,2, zi,2)]− w¯
ª
≥ w¯. (11)
17To easy notation, in this section I will eliminate any reference to the parameter φ which
doesn’t play any role here.
18By introducing some element limiting the managerial bargaining power on the second
period labor market, firms would be able to retain part of such extra profits. In this case
firm net earnings wouldn’t be the same and, in particular, the less efficient firm would have a
smaller price.
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Recall that zj,2 ∼ N(τzj,1, (1 + τ)σ2ε), so that condition 11 is equivalent
to r ≥ zj,1. Manager i will then earn his wage premium in period two with
probability one if the event E1 = (zi,1 + ei,1 − eˆ1 > zj,1 > r) is observed, with
probability (1− α) if the event E2 = (zi,1 + ei,1 − eˆ1 > zj,1) ∩ (r ≥ zj,1) is
observed and with probability zero otherwise. At the beginning of period one,
his expected period two wage is then:
wht(ei,1 − eˆ1) = w+
E(zi,1,zj1) [wp(zi,1 + ei,1 − eˆ1, zj1)I(E1)]+
(1− α)E(zi,1,zj1) [wp(zi,1 + ei,1 − eˆ1, zj1)I(E2)] =
w +
Z ∞
r
Z ∞
v+eˆ1−ei,1
wp(u+ ei,1 − eˆ1, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v)+
(1− α)
Z r
−∞
Z ∞
v+eˆ1−ei,1
wp(u+ ei,1 − eˆ1, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v).
Rearranging the previous expression one can easily obtain:
wht(ei,1 − eˆ1) = w(ei,1 − eˆ1)− (12)
α
Z r
−∞
Z ∞
v+eˆ1−ei,1
wp(u+ ei,1 − eˆ1, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v).
The interpretation of the previous expression is simple: the existence of a poten-
tial raider imposes an expected loss, with respect to the case in which takeover
are not possible, and this loss is exactly the expected wage premium manager i
could have gained when the other firm is taken over weighted with the probabil-
ity of effectively suffer such a loss, which is α. Taking derivatives of the previous
expression one obtains:
w0ht(ei,1 − eˆ1) = w0(ei,1 − eˆ1)−
−α
Z r
−∞
Z ∞
v+eˆ1−ei,1
wp2(u+ ei,1 − eˆ1, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v).
Since the function wp2 is always positive, the previous expression indicates that,
in this particular model, the existence of a potential raider reduces managerial
incentives with respect to the case in which the threat of a hostile takeover is not
present. Similarly to the case of no takeover, the unique first period equilibrium
level of effort eht is characterized by the condition g0(eht) = w0ht(0) < w
0(0)
which clearly identifies a lower level of effort than in the previous section.
The second period equilibrium expected wage, for both managers, can be
written as follows:
w∗ht = wht(0) = w
∗ − α
Z r
−∞
Z ∞
v
wp(φ, u, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v) < w
∗. (13)
Managers have then a smaller expected wage in period two, basically because the
presence of a potential raider reduces the comparative value of being efficient.
Note also that the expected wage decreases in α.
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4.2 Discussion
In treating the possibility of a takeover, I didn’t discuss the traditional free rider
problem among shareholders that tends to increase the tender price. Indeed,
it exists a very strong evidence that most of the efficiency gain produced with
a hostile takeover goes to target shareholders, in the form of an above the
market price (see for example Jensen and Ruback 1983 for a survey of the early
literature), but this is not the issue at stake here, since I was primarily concerned
with the ex ante incentive effect of the takeover threat. Of course, if the raider is
forced to pay a higher tender price, fewer takeover attempts result so mitigating
their effect.
Most important here is the source of the negative incentive effect, which has
not yet been described in the literature. To better understand it, recall that
there are two reasons motivating the managerial effort in period one: first, a
larger effort induces a higher probability of being the best and then of earning
a wage premium and, second, it also increases the expected wage premium that
can be obtained. In this model, however, if a takeover is observed the bad
manager exits the industry but, as a bad manager, he doesn’t really suffer any
additional loss from the takeover, because he ends up with his reservation wage
in any case. A manager’s real fear is then of being the worst and it doesn’t matter
whether, in such a case, he is also forced to exit the market by a takeover. The
first kind of incentive, then, is not affected by the threat of a takeover. From
the other hand, wage premia are smaller under such a threat so that the other
source of incentive is reduced, as well as the equilibrium expected wage for the
bad manager.
The fact that poorly performing managers do not earn much above their
reservation salary is very likely to be true if there isn’t any other source of pri-
vate benefits within the firm. For example, entrenched managers, that are able
to fix their own compensation while, at the same time, diluting the monitoring
role of the board, are probably enjoying high rents regardless of their perfor-
mance. In such a case the threat of a hostile takeover is much more serious and
would probably have a disciplining effect on managers. This discussion suggests
that where the governance structure is weak allowing managers to expropriate
shareholders, a hostile takeover can be an effective disciplining device but, in the
presence of an otherwise good governance system that itself effectively punishes
underperforming managers, takeover is not only unnecessary but even harmful
because tends to reduce managerial career concerns. In this light, an anti-
takeover legislation is beneficial in those industries that have already achieved
good governance standards but should otherwise be regarded suspiciously.
To conclude this brief discussion it is worth noting that the upsurge in U.S.
managerial compensation observed during the 90’s and corresponding to the
spreading adoption of antitakeover legislation is consistent with the previous
analysis. A stronger legal protection against a takeover corresponds in the model
to a smaller value of α, and then to a larger wage. It is usually thought that
the adoption of antitakeover legislation is the result of some form of political
pressure carried out by managers, eventually constituted in a lobby. The present
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analysis, however, suggests that such legislation could be efficiently adopted as
long as good governance practices are already established.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper represents an attempt to study the effects of the product market com-
petitive level on the intensity of career concerns. Vickers (1995) suggests that
the most basic characteristic of competition is the very existence of competitors
and this in itself allows firms to confront the performance of their management
with that of other firms’. This relative performance evaluation in the case of
career concerns means, according to Vickers, that the learning process on the
unknown ability of any given manager takes into account both own performance
and the performance of any other manager in the market. Of course this form of
relative performance evaluation is relevant only if there exists some correlation
among the agents’ abilities and its effect depends on the sign of such correlation.
If managers’ ability are positively correlated then the observation of a good in-
dustry performance is the signal that managers’ ability is indeed high so that,
in this case, the wage paid to any given manager results to be an increasing
function of the market performance and this fact gives managers the possibility
to free ride on other managers performances then, in principle reducing incen-
tives. The opposite is true if managers ability are negatively correlated (but
this latter possibility has a clear meaning only in the case of two managers).
Vickers then shows that the overall effect on the ex ante incentive to provide
effort depends crucially on the correlation in the measurement errors affecting
individual performances: if there is a large positive correlation, incentives to
provide effort are increased, the intuition being that if this correlation is strong
the precision with which firms can observe their manager’s ability is higher and
then any given level of effort has a higher impact on the learning process.
The approach presented in this paper abstracts from the existence of any
correlation among managers ability (they were in fact assumed to be indepen-
dent), but the competition among managers on the labor market introduces a
new form of relative performance evaluation that is referred to as a "lagged in-
direct relative performance evaluation": managers are ranked according to past
performances and those who resulted the best are offered the highest wages in
the future, whose exact amount depends on the level of profits they are able
to produce, that is, on the value of their efficiency. It was then shown that
changes in market parameters that reduce the value of efficiency also reduces
ex ante incentive to provide effort. The existence of a potential raider was also
shown to reduce the value of efficiency and then to exert a downward pressure
on incentive. It is important to stress that the argument given to describe the
negative effect of takeover implicitly assume that there isn’t any kind of private
benefit that managers are extracting from their job. If this is not the case the
takeover mechanism is of course an important device to remove an inefficient
management who is earning above its contribution to the firm and also, the fear
of loosing the private benefits provides ex ante incentives to exert effort. How-
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ever, if good governance systems are already in place and prevent management
from expropriating shareholders, the above analysis shows a possible downside
of takeover19 .
The effect of product market competition on the managerial career concerns
is an effect that emerges from the interaction of two markets: the firms product
market and the managerial labor market. As such, it would be better treated in
a general equilibrium framework but, unfortunately, there isn’t any satisfactory
way of treating imperfect competition in general equilibrium models. The anal-
ysis in this paper, which is framed in a partial equilibrium context, then suffers
of several limitations. For example, top executives’ skills are usually of a general
nature and are worth more or less the same in many different markets. It is in
fact not infrequent that the CEO of a firm in a given industry moves to some
firm in another industry. In the partial equilibrium framework used in this pa-
per, this would mean that the exogenous outside option for any given manager
depends in fact on his performance in the industry, but the kind of dependence
would certainly be better treated as a general equilibrium phenomenon. The
model should also allow for more then two managers and, possibly, for overlap-
ping generations of managers but these are relatively simpler extensions that
shouldn’t add too much to the result obtained above.
At a more general level, much remain to be understood on the interaction
between competition (in product or factor markets) and corporate governance
mechanisms, but my impression is that a reasonable treatment of strategic in-
teractions in general equilibrium is needed to properly address these and related
issues.
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